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INTERNAL REALISM: TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM? 
Curtis Brown 
  
Idealism is an ontological view, a view about what sorts of things there are in 
the universe. Idealism holds that what there is depends on our own mental 
structure and activity. Berkeley of course held that everything was mental; Kant 
held the more complex view that there was an important distinction between 
the mental and the physical, but that the structure of the empirical world 
depended on the activities of minds. Despite radical differences, idealists like 
Berkeley and Kant share what Ralph Barton Perry called "the cardinal principle 
of idealism," namely, the principle that "being is dependent on the knowing of 
it."1 I believe that Hilary Putnam intends his "internal realism" to be a version 
of idealism in this broad sense; although many of his arguments concern 
semantic notions like truth and reference, he takes these semantic arguments to 
have ontological consequences. This is strongly suggested, for instance, by his 
claim that "'objects' themselves are as much made as discovered, as much 
products of our conceptual invention as of the 'objective' factor in experience."2 
Or again there is this rather Kantian metaphor: "the mind and the world jointly 
make up the mind and the world."3 But just what is Putnam's ontology? 
Putnam has been defending a version of anti-realism in his writings of the last 
several years. He describes his view as "internal realism," where the term 
"internal" is intended to indicate his rejection of the view he calls 
"metaphysical realism." Putnam combines internal realism and metaphysical 
anti-realism in something like the way Kant combined empirical realism and 
transcendental idealism. I would like to investigate here one of the numerous 
lines of thought by means of which Putnam has defended internal realism. The 
argument I shall be focussing on is what might be called the "argument from 
reference." Putnam also has arguments from vagueness, from the nature of 
truth, and others; I will not discuss these. 
It would be interesting to undertake a full-scale investigation of the relations 
between Kant's transcendental idealism and Putnam's internal realism. Putnam 
himself invites this comparison by his frequent use of Kantian terminology and 
his allusions to Kant's work, and indeed the parallels are numerous. Both 
consider, somewhat uncomfortably, the view that there is an 
unknowable noumenal world behind the phenomena. Both are motivated in part 
by the threat of scepticism: Kant by scepticism about our ability to know the 
external world, Putnam by scepticism about our ability to refer to it. Both Kant 
and Putnam hold that the world we know and talk about is empirically real, but 
both hold also that it is mind-dependent. Putnam at least flirts with the Kantian 
idea that there are a priori truths about the world.4 Putnam, like Kant, stresses 
the pervasive importance of causation, and argues that causation is partly our 
own imposition on the world.5 Putnam argues that science presupposes values, 
in a way reminiscent of Kant's claim that science requires the regulative use of 
the Ideas of Reason. Like Kant, Putnam argues that the relation between 
morality and rationality is much closer than empiricists (from Hume to 
Bentham to the positivists) typically can allow.6 
I shall not attempt such a full-scale investigation here. My purpose is to discuss 
one particular issue: Putnam's Kantian response to a kind of scepticism, 
namely scepticism about the possibility of reference. The paper divides into 
three parts. In section I, I discuss the view that in classifying or organizing the 
world into objects, we create objects. I explain what I take to be a plausible 
realist alternative to this view. The remainder of the paper discusses Putnam's 
reason for rejecting this realist account, namely, his argument that reference to 
mind-independent objects is impossible. I propose to accept the argument and 
see what follows from it. If determinate reference to mind-independent objects 
is impossible, this seems to leave open two possible responses. One might hold 
that we refer indeterminately to mind-independent objects, or that we refer 
determinately to mind-dependent objects. The first view retains a realist 
ontology at the expense of determinate reference; the second retains 
determinate reference by adopting an idealist ontology. In section II I discuss 
the former possibility, a response Putnam rejects. Putnam claims that this view 
introduces the problems of Kant's notion of the thing-in-itself; I question this. 
In section III I discuss the second response, that we refer determinately to 
mind-dependent objects. I suggest that this view is actually at least as Kantian 
in spirit as the one Putnam rejects. I also suggest that it is not clear that this 






Let us begin, then, with what we might call "the argument from organization." 
According to this argument, because our language organizes, selects, 
categorizes, and classifies things, the things we talk about are not part of the 
world as it is in itself, but rather are created by us. To be sure, we do not create 
the raw material out of which we produce objects, but the objects themselves, 
as opposed to neutral stuff of the world in itself, are our own creations. If this is 
correct, then the world we talk about is mind-dependent, and idealism in the 
broad sense I am concerned with is true. 
I do not mean to suggest that Putnam is committed to this argument, at least in 
the unsophisticated form in which I have just phrased it. But he does say things 
that suggest it. He writes, for instance, that: "'Objects' do not exist 
independently of conceptual schemes. We cut up the world into objects when 
we introduce one or another scheme of description. Since the objects and the 
signs alike are internal to the scheme of description, it is possible to say what 
matches what."7 This suggests that if we did not "cut up the world into objects" 
there would be no objects, so that we bring objects into being by organizing the 
world. Again, Putnam criticizes the view that there are "Self-Identifying 
Objects," explaining that "this is just what it means to say that the world, and 
not thinkers, sorts things into kinds," and he opposes to this idea the view that 
"'objects' are as much made as discovered,"8 suggesting again that the fact that 
we organize the world shows that we create objects. To take a final example, 
Putnam speaks approvingly of the idea "that objects and reference arise out of 
discourse rather than being prior to discourse."9 
As Putnam is well aware, similar arguments are common in contemporary 
thought; one particularly explicit and unapologetic defense of the view may be 
found in Leszek Kolakowski's "Karl Marx and the Classical Definition of 
Truth."10 Kolakowski, as the title suggests, attributes the view to Marx. Just as 
Putnam criticizes the view that objects are "self-
identifying," Kolakowski criticizes "Aristotelian realism, which posits that the 
species and genera into which the sciences divide reality are merely copies of 
the genera and species of this reality reflected more or less exactly, but ever 
more exactly, in the mirror of consciousness."11 As Putnam says that objects 
are "as much made as discovered," Kolakowski says things like this: "Nature as 
composed of parts and species is an 'artificial' creation;"12 or again: "In this 
world the sun and stars exist because man is able to make them his objects;"13 
or again: "If, for Marx, man replaces God-the-Creator, still He is not the God of 
Augustine or Thomas Aquinas, a God who gives birth to the world out of 
nothingness; rather, He reminds us of the God of the Averroists, who organizes 
the world out of previously existing material."14 
In Kolakowski especially, one gets the idea that there are only two possible 
views. On the one hand there is "Aristotelean realism," which holds that the 
universe divides itself up into a single set of kinds, and that the proper role of 
language is to copy the world's own single set of divisions, to classify the world 
in its own way. This seems to be the same view Putnam describes as the view 
that the world contains Self-Identifying Objects. On the other hand, there 
is Kolakowski's preferred view, which seems also to be Putnam's: that the 
world "in itself" is undifferentiated (he speaks of a "pre-existing 'chaos'"15), 
and that we create objects by inventing 
classifications. Kolakowski's argumentative strategy seems to be to argue that 
since Aristotelian realism is false, his own version of anti-realism must be 
correct. 
Now if this were the anti-realist's only argument that the world is mind-
dependent (as in fact it seems to be Kolakowski's only argument), then the 
realist could quite plausibly assert that it simply is not good enough. One can 
grant that it is false that the world has one true classification or division into 
objects and kinds of objects without granting that it has no organization of its 
own. A modest realist might well say that the world has infinitely many 
classifications, that it contains infinitely many different kinds of objects. Such a 
moderate realist could say that when we develop a language we are not 
imposing an organization on the world, but selecting one of the world's 
organizations for our own use. On this view the world "in itself" 
has more objects than we usually talk about, not fewer. 
Modest realism shares with Putnam's and Kolakowski's views an emphasis on 
the importance of human activity in determining what sorts of things we will be 
most concerned with, but, if accepted, makes unnecessary the idealistic view 
that in dividing up the world we are somehow populating our world with 
objects that were not there before. 
But this is not the end of the matter. Kolakowski, as far as I can tell, simply 
does not consider modest realism. Or it may even be that he accepts modest 
realism, and that his talk of "creating" objects carries no really anti-realist 
implications but is only a metaphorical way of expressing a modestly realistic 
view. But Putnam carries the matter further than this. He argues that 
determinate reference to mind-independent objects is impossible; we may take 
this as an argument that if the goal of language is to select from among the 
world's many organizations, it can never succeed in picking out just one. To 




Putnam places a good deal of weight on an argument that determinate reference 
to mind-independent objects is impossible. He has discussed the argument in a 
number of places, most notably in "Models and Reality"16 and in Chapter 2 of 
Reason, Truth and History. The general idea of the argument is that no amount 
of holding-true of sentences, including sentences that use the term 'reference', 
will suffice to uniquely determine referents for our terms. No matter how 
elaborate our theories, including our theories of reference, if they are consistent 
they can be made true by endless different assignments of referents to their 
singular terms. Indeed, Putnam argues in Reason, Truth and History that 
endless assignments of referents can even leave the truth conditions of all the 
sentences of any consistent theory the same. So no matter how we try to 
constrain reference from the "inside," so to speak, it will remain indeterminate. 
The conclusion is strikingly similar to Quine's thesis of the inscrutability of 
reference,17 and indeed Putnam speaks of himself as 
extending Quine's result.18 The discussions of Putnam's recent work that I am 
aware of assume that the argument is successful; disagreement comes over 
what to conclude from it. Most of Putnam's critics have urged that, since the 
argument shows that "internal" constraints on reference do not suffice to pick 
out a single correspondence relation between words and the world, there must 
be some sort of "external" constraint which does this. Two sorts of external 
constraints have been suggested. David Lewis has suggested that what is 
needed is an "inegalitarianism" of classifications of the world, the view that the 
world really does in a sense come pre-divided into objects. What is needed, 
Lewis says, is "the traditional realism that recognises objective sameness and 
difference, joints in the world, discriminatory classifications not of our own 
making."19 It then becomes a constraint on interpretations that they maximize 
the assignment of "elite classes" as referents. Not that this constraint operates 
because we intend to refer to elite classes: perhaps we do, but that intention, 
like all our other intentions, is susceptible of countless interpretations, 
including interpretations in which 'elite class' refers to classes that are not 
objectively elite. Rather, it is just in the nature of things that some classes are 
more gerrymandered than others, and the correct assignment of referents will 
maximize the assignment of the least gerrymandered classes, so far as this is 
compatible with meeting the other constraints on reference. 
The second sort of constraint that has been proposed is a causal constraint. The 
idea here is that the referent of a term might be the object suitably causally 
connected to peoples' use of the term. There is a kind of standoff about this 
constraint. Putnam points out that we cannot from the inside determine the 
referent of 'cause' any more than we can other referents, so adding some such 
sentence as "Cats cause the use of the term 'cat'" to our total theory will not 
help to fix the interpretation of that theory. The total theory could be interpreted 
by taking 'cat' to refer to some bizarre class of objects and 'cause' to refer to 
some bizarre relation that relates these bizarre objects to our use of the term 
'cat'.20 Does it follow that we cannot single out a relation, causation, that 
narrows down the acceptable interpretations? No, as causal theorists reply. Our 
use of the term 'cause' is caused by the relation of causation, so that if the 
causal constraint on reference is correct it determines the interpretation of 
'cause' "from the outside."21 
Thus the standoff. If Putnam is correct that the only constraints on reference 
must be internal, then the causal theory of reference does not help narrow down 
interpretations, since it cannot succeed in picking out a single relation, 
causation. On the other hand, if there can be external constraints on reference, 
then the interpretation of the causal theory itself may be determined by the 
external relation of causation, so that it can succeed in narrowing down the 
possible interpretations of the rest of our theory. Nevertheless it seems to me 
that in one sense Putnam is in the stronger position here (and not just for the 
interesting dialectical reason noted by Lewis22). There are countless relations 
that the causal theorist could, for all internal constraints can determine, be 
referring to when he or she uses the term 'cause'. Granted, causality is causally 
related to 'cause', but then the weird relation shmausality is shmausally related 
to the word 'cause'. What makes causality rather than shmausality the important 
relation here?23 It cannot be anything about us, so it must be something about 
the world. Putnam suggests that the best the causal theorist can do is "claim that 
a relation can at one and the same time be a physical relation and have the 
dignity (the built-in intentionality, in other words) of choosing its own 
name."24 This seems unjust to me. But what the causal theorist must do is to 
advocate the inegalitarianism Lewis discusses. The causal theorist must hold 
that some relations are less gerrymandered and bizarre than others, and that 
what singles out causation as the referent of 'cause' is that, of the relations 
which are otherwise possible referents, causation is the most natural. If this is 
correct then it is misleading to think of there being a choice between causality 
and objective similarity as the right external constraint. Objective similarity 
must be appealed to whether there is a further appeal to causation or not. 
For my purposes the interest of this discussion of external constraints is that it 
looks as though any external constraint will require what Kolakowski calls 
"Aristotelean realism." In section I, I suggested that there were three possible 
metaphysical views: Aristotelean realism, which holds that the world has an 
organization of its own; modest realism, which holds that the world has 
numberless organizations of its own; and anti-realism, which holds that the 
world has no organization of its own. Kolakowski defends a kind of anti-
realism by attacking Aristotelean realism, thus ignoring the attractions of 
modest realism. But now it appears as though the modest realist will have to 
hold that reference is indeterminate, that we never manage to select a single 
organization of the world for our own purposes. 
Let us now leave Aristotelean realism behind. I do not see that Putnam has 
managed to show that it is untenable, but I also do not see how to advance its 
discussion further. Let us consider modest realism and Putnam's internal 
realism (i.e., anti-realism, or "idealism" in the broad sense I have been 
employing). Putnam's argument appears to be perfectly compatible with modest 
realism; the straightforward reading of the moral of the argument would be 
only that there is a surprising and disturbing indeterminacy in our reference to 
the real, mind-independent world. It is not the argument about reference alone, 
but that argument together with his rejection of indeterminacy that leads 
Putnam to his idealistic ontology. But why exactly does Putnam reject 
indeterminacy? 
In Reason, Truth and History, the earliest of the publications I am considering 
here, Putnam explains that he will be exploring an alternative to Quine's view 
that "it is just an illusion . . . that the terms in our language have determinate 
well-defined counterparts."25 But in this book he does not, so far as I can tell, 
offer any reason for rejecting indeterminacy. He does note that indeterminacy is 
disturbing because "no such 'indeterminacy' rises in the 'notional world' of the 
speaker,"26 but he does not take this to be a reason to reject indeterminacy, for 
as he nicely observes, "the fact that in our belief system or 'notional world' no 
cat is a cherry means that in each admissible interpretation of that belief system 
. . . the referents of 'cat' and the referents of 'cherry' must be disjoint sets. But 
the disjointness of these sets is compatible with the (remarkable) fact that what 
is the set of 'cats' in one admissible interpretation may be the set of 'cherries' in 
a different (but equally admissible) interpretation."27 
In Realism and Reason, Putnam does offer a criticism of indeterminacy. He 
writes of the view that reference is indeterminate that: "I cannot accept it for 
my own language, because to do so would turn the notion of an object into a 
totally metaphysical notion. I know what tables are and what cats are and what 
black holes are. But what am I to make of the notion of an X which is a 
table or a cat or a black hole (or the number three or . . .)?"28 Let us pause here 
for a moment before picking up the quotation again. Isn't this description of the 
view unfair? First of all, the advocate of indeterminacy does not hold that there 
is some object which is not determinately a cat or a table or whatever. It is not 
the objects themselves that are indeterminate, but rather which objects we are 
referring to. So perhaps Putnam should ask rather what to make of the notion of 
a word which refers to tables or cats or black holes, etc. But this also would be 
unfair. For no interpretation of English makes it true that there is a word which 
refers to tables or cats or black holes. The most we can say is that some 
interpretations assign to 'cat' the same referents that other interpretations assign 
to 'table'. And even in saying this we need to keep in mind that this is only 
possible as part of wide-ranging differences in the interpretation of other 
singular terms and predicates. 
Let us now return to Putnam's criticism of indeterminacy. Immediately after the 
last-quoted sentence, Putnam writes: "An object which has no properties at all 
in itself and any property you like 'in a model' is an inconceivable Ding an sich. 
The doctrine of ontological relativity avoids the problems of medieval 
philosophy (the problems of classical realism) but it takes on the problems of 
Kantian metaphysics in their place." But again, the interpretation of the 
indeterminist position seems incorrect. The indeterminist does not deny that 
objects have properties in themselves. The indeterminacy is in our reference to 
objects and properties, not in the objects or properties themselves. We can, to 
be sure, say that the referent of 'table' on one interpretation is hard and wooden 
while on another interpretation it is soft and furry; but that is not to say that 
there is an object which in itself is neither hard and wooden nor soft and furry, 
only that it is indeterminate which object 'table' refers to. Moreover, even the 
point that the referent of 'table' has different properties on different 
interpretations misleadingly suggests more looseness than is actually present, 
since on any interpretation the referent of 'table' has the property expressed by 
'hard and wooden', and on no interpretation does the referent of 'table' have the 
property expressed by 'soft and furry'. 
The problems with Kant's metaphysics come from the problematic relation 
between the two worlds he talks about: the phenomenal, empirical world and 
the noumenal world of things in themselves. The view that reference is 
indeterminate does incorporate the Kantian view that there are things in 
themselves, that there are mind-independent objects in the world. But this is 
just to say that it incorporates realism. It also holds that reference is to things in 
themselves and that knowledge is of things in themselves, though it admits that 
reference is less deterministic than we would like. It thus avoids Kant's 
interposition of a made-up world between our experiences and the really real 
world. It thus also avoids, I would suggest, the problems of Kantian 
metaphysics. In the next section, I will suggest that Putnam's own view is 
actually more Kantian than the one he here rejects. 
The paragraph of Putnam's I have just quoted and criticized is, so far as I know, 
the only place where he justifies his rejection of the view that reference is 
simply indeterminate--with the exception of one sentence in "Is the Causal 
Structure of the Physical Itself Something Physical?" In that paper he describes 
the view as "incoherent," explaining that it "requires us to believe in a world of 
things in themselves that have no determinate relations to our language."29 
This certainly describes the view fairly. But why is it incoherent? It seems to 
me to be perfectly coherent, though admittedly rather unsettling. 
I have now discussed two realist responses to Putnam's argument about 
reference. Aristotelean realism agrees that nothing internal can fix reference, 
but holds that the world itself is organized into kinds and thus that there can be 
external constraints on reference. It thereby defends the possibility of 
determinate reference to mind-independent objects. Modest realism denies that 
any of the possible classifications of the world are inherently preferable to 
others, and so holds that we refer indeterminately to mind-independent objects. 
I turn now to Putnam's own preferred view. 
  
III 
Putnam's own view about reference, I take it, is that we refer determinately to 
mind-dependent objects. In Reason, Truth and History, after mentioning the 
view that reference is simply indeterminate, Putnam says that he "will explore 
the alternative . . . of giving up the idea . . . that words stand in some sort of 
one-one relation to (discourse-independent) things and sets of things."30 This is 
puzzling at first, since this is precisely what the view that reference is 
indeterminate does as well. But while indeterminism gives up the one-one 
relation, Putnam's internal realism gives up the discourse-independence: "a sign 
that is actually employed in a particular way by a particular community of users 
can correspond to particular objects within the conceptual scheme of those 
users. 'Objects' do not exist independently of conceptual schemes. . . . Since the 
objects and the signs are alike internal to the scheme of description, it is 
possible to say what matches what."31 
I am not at all sure I understand this. I am not sure what it is for an object, as 
opposed to a description, to be within a conceptual scheme. But I take it 
internal realism is not supposed to do damage to the truths of common sense: it 
does not deny that there are objects that are separate from us and that we 
interact with causally. It is just that to some extent the character of the objects 
and relations is mind-dependent. But now it is tempting to ask how mind-
dependence can help with the puzzle about reference. It is not at all clear that 
the argument that reference is indeterminate rests on any assumptions about the 
mind-independence of objects. Suppose that tables and cats and the rest are 
somehow mind-dependent. Isn't it still the case that talk that uses the word 
'table' can be interpreted consistently either as talk about tables or as talk about 
cats? How does the mind-dependence of tables and cats help fix which one 
'table' refers to? 
On Putnam's view we ordinarily use terms to refer to objects that are mind-
dependent. But Putnam's argument about reference does not appear to violate 
ordinary usage; it seems to use words in the same old familiar way, though it 
manages in doing so to arrive at startling conclusions. But if we ordinarily use 
words to refer to mind-dependent objects, and Putnam's argument uses words 
in the ordinary way, then it seems that the argument shows that reference to 
mind-dependent objects is indeterminate. 
Perhaps it misrepresents Putnam's position to say that he holds that our terms 
correspond determinately to mind-dependent objects. He suggests that the 
whole notion of correspondence needs to be overthrown. When he offers a 
positive account of reference, he advocates a kind of disquotational theory of 
reference according to which "we understand 'refers to' not by associating the 
phrase 'refers to' with a 'correspondence', but by learning 
such assertability conditions as the following: . . . 'Cat' refers to an object X if 
and only if X is a cat."32 He goes on to explain that "reference . . . is not 
something prior to truth; rather, knowing the conditions under which sentences 
about, say, tables, are true is knowing what 'table' refers to."33 
It is not altogether straightforward to locate the difference between Putnam and 
the defender of indeterminacy here. The defender of indeterminacy will also 
say that knowing the truth conditions of sentences containing 'table' is all there 
is to know about reference. For the indeterminist, there are no facts about 
reference beyond those fixed by our use of the language; this is what 
distinguishes the indeterminist from the Aristotelean realist. But, the 
indeterminist will point out, precisely what the argument about reference shows 
is that truth conditions of sentences containing 'table' are not enough to fix a 
unique referent for 'table'. Many different referents for 'table' will make the 
same sentences come out true, including the sentence "'table' refers to tables." It 
is precisely because knowing truth conditions is knowing all there is to know 
about reference that reference is indeterminate. 
I have two suggestions as to what distinguishes Putnam from the indeterminist 
realist, neither of them very satisfactory. The first is that Putnam really wants to 
deny that there is any such relation as reference between words and things. 
'Refers' is merely a device of semantic descent, so that ultimately it only relates 
words to other words: words with quotation marks around them to words 
without quotation marks. The relation between 'table' and the world cannot be 
indeterminate because there is no such relation. This view would have the 
consequence that, at least at the level of individual terms, language is not about 
the world at all. But if this were Putnam's view then he ought not to talk about 
the mind-dependence of objects; he ought instead to insist that talk about 
objects simply makes no sense. 
This brings us to the second suggestion about what distinguishes Putnam from 
the indeterminist. Perhaps Putnam means to simply make it true by definition 
that reference is determinate. Perhaps he simply intends to use the word 'object' 
in such a way that knowing the truth conditions of sentences does suffice to 
determine what objects those sentences are about. (But wouldn't this establish 
the determinacy of reference in the same way that defining 'God' as 'omnipotent 
omniscient omnibenevolent existing person' establishes the existence of God?) 
An "object" in this sense would perhaps be whatever is common to the our uses 
of 'table' on any interpretation that meets the available constraints: the word 
'table' itself and perhaps associated descriptions and experiences. Talk about 
objects would then really be talk about words and descriptions and experiences. 
Or rather, since we surely need to preserve some sort of distinction between 
purely linguistic and mental phenomena, on the one hand, and objects, on the 
other, we would perhaps make up a kind of imaginary world, a notional or 
phenomenal world, and treat reference as reference to this phenomenal world. 
On this account objects would be mind-dependent in a very strong sense. But 
also on this account the determinacy of reference would be a kind of pretense, 
either pretended determinate reference to real things or really determinate 
reference to pretend things. There would still be real, mind-independent objects 
in the world, and the fact that we could not determinately refer to them would 
still be troubling. 
The unsatisfactoriness of both of these suggestions is evidence that neither of 
them is what Putnam has in mind. I wish I had a better suggestion to offer. My 
guess is that the second suggestion comes closer than the first. But if anything 
resembling the second suggestion is correct, than Putnam's internal realism is 
very similar indeed to Kant's transcendental idealism. For it introduces 
precisely the Kantian contrast between the phenomenal world which we can 
know (refer to) precisely because we largely make it up ourselves, and the 
mind-independent noumenal world to which we have no (determinate) access. 
Making up a phenomenal world can hardly make the things themselves go 
away. And Putnam himself occasionally verges on acknowledging that there 
must be mind-independent objects behind the phenomenal ones: "I am not 
inclined to scoff at the idea of a noumenal ground behind the dualities of 
experience, even if all attempts to talk about it lead to antinomies,"34 and 
again: "Today the notion of a noumenal world is perceived to be an 
unnecessary metaphysical element in Kant's thought. (But perhaps Kant is 
right: perhaps we can't help thinking that there is somehow a mind-independent 
'ground' for our experience even if attempts to talk about it lead at once to 
nonsense.)"35 So Putnam himself is enmeshed in the Kantian distinction 
between appearances and things in themselves. We have seen Putnam object to 
indeterminism that "it takes on the problems of Kantian metaphysics." But it 
now appears that this criticism may be applied with at least equal justice to 
internal realism itself.35 
  
NOTES 
1. Ralph Barton Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies (New York: 
Longmans, Green and Co., 1912; Third Impression, Revised, 1916), p. 114. 
Perry meant this characterization to cover Berkeley, Kant, and Hegel, among 
others; I take it that his attempt to state what they have in common would meet 
with wide agreement. More recently, Thomas Nagel has suggested that the 
"common element" in a variety of versions of idealism, including both 
historical versions and the views of such contemporaries as 
Davidson, Strawson, and Wittgenstein, is "a broadly epistemological test of 
reality." Nagel, The View From Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1986), p. 91. 
2. Hilary Putnam, Reason, Truth and History (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981), p. 54. 
3. Reason, Truth and History, p. xi. 
4. Hilary Putnam, Realism and Reason, Philosophical Papers Volume 
3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), papers 6 and 7. 
5. Realism and Reason, papers 12 and 16; "Is the Causal Structure of the 
Physical Itself Something Physical?" Midwest Studies in Philosophy volume 9 
(1984), 3-16. 
6. Reason, Truth and History, especially chapters 6, 7, and 9. 
7. Reason, Truth and History, p. 52. 
8. Reason, Truth and History, pp. 53-4. 
9. Realism and Reason, p. xvi. 
10. Leszek Kolakowski, "Karl Marx and the Classical Definition of Truth," 
in Kolakowski, Toward a Marxist Humanism, translated from the Polish by 
Jane Zielonko Peel (New York: Grove Press, 1968). 
11. Kolakowski, p. 46. 
12. Kolakowski, p. 52. Here I quote the slightly different version of this paper 
published in Kolakowski's Marxism and Beyond (p. 73). The version in Toward 
a Marxist Humanism attributes to Marx "the idea that nature is composed of 
separate parts and that species are an 'artificial creation'," which changes the 
meaning in a way that seems contrary to Kolakowski's intention. 
13. Kolakowski, p. 48. 
14. Kolakowski, p. 57. 
15. Kolakowski, p. 54. 
16. Putnam, "Models and Reality," in Realism and Reason. 
17. See especially Quine's "Ontological Relativity," in Quine, Ontological 
Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), pp. 
26-68. 
18. Reason, Truth and History, p. 33. 
19. David Lewis, "Putnam's Paradox," Australasian Journal of Philosophy vol. 
62 (1984), 221-36, at 228. Lewis credits the suggestion to G. H. Merrill, "The 
Model-Theoretic Argument Against Realism," Philosophy of Science vol. 47 
(1980), 69-81. 
20. Compare Realism and Reason, p. xi. 
21. See e.g. Michael Devitt, "Realism and the Renegade Putnam: A Critical 
Study of Meaning and the Moral Sciences," Nous vol. 17 (1983), 291-301, at 
298-9; Devitt, Realism and Truth (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), pp. 188-91. 
22. Lewis, 225-6. 
23. Compare Putnam, Realism and Reason, p. 296; and "Is the Causal Structure 
of the Physical Itself Something Physical?" 6-7. 
24. "Is the Causal Structure of the Physical Itself Something Physical?" 7. 
25. Reason, Truth and History, p. 41. 
26. Reason, Truth and History, p. 44. 
27. Reason, Truth and History, p. 44. 
28. Realism and Reason, p. xiii. 
29. "Is the Causal Structure of the Physical Itself Something Physical?" 6. 
30. Reason, Truth and History, p. 41. 
31. Reason, Truth and History, p. 52. 
32. Realism and Reason, p. xv. 
33. Realism and Reason, p. xvi; cf. Reason, Truth and History, p. 52. 
34. Realism and Reason, p. 226. 
34. Reason, Truth and History, pp. 61-2. 
35. Work on this paper was supported in part by a National Endowment for the 
Humanities grant to the Trinity University Philosophy Department for a 
curriculum development project in the history of philosophy. 
